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ance markets. Using reasonably calibrated parameters, we observe that high involuntary unemployment
intensity and loading factors could be important explanations for the empirical ﬁndings emphasized in
recent studies. We also ﬁnd that an individual with high leisure demand after retirement reduces con-
sumption during retirement and increases stockholdings as retirement time approaches.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction straints in a complete market with frictions. Most existing studiesDuring the past decade, a number of researchers have studied
optimal choice of retirement time under various conditions, such
as uninsurable labor income (Viceira, 2001), an individual’s disutil-
ity (Choi and Shim, 2006), or ﬂexible labor supply (Bodie et al.,
1992). By extending the study of Karatzas and Wang (2000), Farhi
and Panageas (2007, henceforth FP) and Dybvig and Liu (2009,
henceforth DL) model an individual’s labor supply choice as an
optimal stopping problem, implying that she can then decide her
optimal retirement time voluntarily. However, There are no studies
on the optimal retirement time of an individual who encounters
unemployment risk (i.e., the risk of involuntary retirement), even
though involuntary unemployment is an important social welfare
issue. From this perspective, deciding the optimal retirement of
an individual given these involuntary unemployment risks plays
a key role in policy-making and ﬁnancial decision making.
This paper investigates an individual’s optimal retirement in the
presence of involuntary unemployment risks and borrowing con-on this optimal retirement problem (e.g., the papers by FP and DL)
attempt to ﬁnd an individual’s optimal consumption, investment,
and voluntary retirement time simultaneously. Here, we consider
another situation in which an individual might be involuntarily
unemployed before her optimal retirement date and has borrowing
constraints. Moreover, we attempt to construct a complete market
with frictions through the purchase of an unemployment insur-
ance policy.
Speciﬁcally, this paper makes three major contributions.
First, our approach explicitly considers the role of unemploy-
ment risks in a life-cycle model. This life-cycle model is associated
with an individual’s optimal consumption, portfolio and retire-
ment time, where she is able to choose her retirement time, but
could be forced to retire early for various reasons. We include
the possibility of an individual’s involuntary unemployment into
the conventional set-up, and assume that crucial exogenous shocks
such as sudden ill-health shocks and layoff shocks cause involun-
tary unemployment. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study deal-
ing with an individual’s optimal retirement policy in the presence
of both voluntary retirement and involuntary unemployment pos-
sibilities. Our model shows that a larger involuntary unemploy-
ment possibility might lead workers to early voluntary
retirement, since it restrains the growth of their wealth, and conse-
quently reduces their consumption and stockholdings.
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frictions to solve the optimal retirement problem. Gormley et al.
(2010) investigate the role of insurance in the investment and
savings decisions of households. The complete market we
consider here includes personalized unemployment insurance in
which an individual can purchase to hedge her involuntary unem-
ployment risks. However, we assume that the market price of the
insurance policy is costly compared with its actuarially fair price
in order to reﬂect the consensus that unemployment insurance
markets are not competitive relative to other insurance markets.
We see this market friction corresponds to loading in our model,
which is broadly employed terminology in insurance area (Ehrlich
and Becker, 1972; Campbell, 1980). We ﬁnd that increase in
the loading factor leads to decrease in consumption and
stockholdings.
Finally, we introduce two useful concepts, namely expected
time to retirement and the probability of voluntary retirement.
We deﬁne expected time to retirement as the expectation of the
minimum between voluntary retirement time and involuntary
unemployment time. We show analytic formulas for both expected
time to retirement and the probability of voluntary retirement. To
further explore the implications of our model, we use these con-
cepts and illustrate the relationship between expected time to
retirement and the life-cycle optimal policies, and the link between
changes in the probability of voluntary retirement and an individ-
ual’s wealth level.
Using our model with realistically calibrated parameters
based on related literature dealing with involuntary unemploy-
ment (Lachance and Seligman, 2008; Emery et al., 2010), we ﬁnd
some interesting properties, especially related to two factors in
our model: involuntary unemployment intensity and ﬁxed rate
of the difference between the market price and the actuarially
fair price of unemployment insurance. The model provides alter-
native interpretations of the empirical observations regarding the
shares of stocks by age in Heaton and Lucas (2000) and the
moderate equity holdings puzzle, by examining the relationships
between the degrees of intensity of involuntary unemployment
and optimal policies. Heaton and Lucas (2000) ﬁnd that people
who are close to retirement increase their stockholdings even
though traditional portfolio rule states the opposite, and a
number of recent studies agree with this ﬁnding. The moderate
equity holdings puzzle implies that the amount of equity hold-
ings for stock market participants is moderate (Gomes and
Michaelides, 2005).
The closest studies to ours are FP and DL. Since the model in this
paper determines the optimal retirement time endogenously
under the condition that the individual might lose her job, one
could say that our paper is simply an extension of the work of
FP. Obviously, we add an involuntary unemployment event to
the FP model, but adding one more risk to an economic system
usually involves some unwanted complexity in solving economic
problems. We employ an unemployment insurance, which makes
the ﬁnancial market considered in our model complete.1
Moreover, we consider borrowing constraints that an individual’s
wealth level cannot be negative at all times. Even though FP have
an analysis with such borrowing constraints, they mention that
the borrowing constraints are negligible for high wealth levels and
could play a critical role just for wealth levels close to zero. However,
as DL model with labor income risks importantly includes borrowing
constraints, the borrowing constraints might be important
regardless of wealth level in our model, since the absence of such
constraints implies that there exist some possibility that an1 In general, optimal consumption and investment problems in an incomplete
market are hard to solve, and this fact forces us to construct a complete market.individual enters involuntary unemployment with a negative
wealth. We exclude the case of the individual’s involuntary unem-
ployment with uncollateralized borrowing.
Although our paper and the paper of DL share some techni-
cal approaches, there are several differences. First, our model
focuses on both involuntary and voluntary retirement under
unemployment risks, whereas the DL model considers voluntary
retirement under mortality risks. In our model, the unemploy-
ment risks quantiﬁed by unemployment intensities have various
economic interpretations such as health shocks and layoff
shocks, and using such intensities makes our model very tracta-
ble. Even though both the unemployment insurance against
unemployment risks in this paper and the hedging vehicle
(speciﬁcally, life insurance against mortality risks or annuity
against longevity risks) in the paper by DL are ﬁnancial tools
for market completion, they have a clear difference in terms
of time period covered by them. The unemployment insurance
can provide its coverage before the voluntary retirement time,
while the hedging vehicle in DL provides its coverage depend-
ing on the mortality regardless of individual’s voluntary retire-
ment time. Second, we take market frictions into consider-
ation and try to ﬁnd some economic implications by using
them. Actually, by investigating various numerical results, we
observe that they can have a signiﬁcant effect on an individual’s
behaviors in optimum, and we can provide some interesting
economic implications. We interpret excess unemployment
insurance premiums arising from the market frictions as their
loading factors to realistically reﬂect the fact that unemploy-
ment insurance markets are relatively too thin these days.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes our model
set-up, and Section 3 describes the analytic solution of our prob-
lem. Section 4 introduces useful concepts to be used in proceeding
analysis. Sections 5 and 6 present various properties relating to
involuntary unemployment intensity and loading factors using
empirically plausible parameter values, in the presence and ab-
sence of competitiveness in the unemployment insurance market.
Finally, Section 7 presents concluding remarks.
2. The model
2.1. Financial market
We start with the conventional set-up with a ﬁnancial market
in the presence of two classes of assets: a risk-free asset (e.g., a
bond) and a risky asset (e.g., a stock). The price of a risk-free asset
Sð0Þt follows
dSð0Þt ¼ rSð0Þt dt;
where r is a risk-free interest rate. The stock price St satisﬁes
dSt ¼ lStdt þ rStdBt ;
where l is the expected rate of the stock return, r is the stock vol-
atility, Bt is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a suit-
able probability space ðX; P;F ; fF tgÞ. The ﬁltration fF tgtP0 is the r-
algebra generated by Bt.
Now, we deﬁne the state price density process (or stochastic dis-
count factor) H(t) as
HðtÞ ¼ fðtÞ
gðtÞ ; Hð0Þ ¼ 1;
where f(t) and g(t) are
fðtÞ ¼ exp hBt  12 h2t
 
; fð0Þ ¼ 1; h ¼ lrr ;
gðtÞ ¼ ert :
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tarily. The involuntary retirement occurs when an exogenous
shock arrives before she decides voluntary retirement. We take
the constant kU such that
P½t < sU  ¼ ekUt
where sU is the involuntary unemployment time. Therefore, kU is
the intensity of the involuntary unemployment time and sU is the
time of the ﬁrst jump of a standard Poisson process. We denote
fGtgtP0 the r-algebra of information acquired by the family sU ^ t
and the information is about whether the involuntary unemploy-
ment happens or not. The augmented ﬁltration fHtgtP0 is the small-
est right continuous family of r-ﬁelds such that both F t and Gt .
In addition to considering involuntary unemployment risks
caused by exogenous shocks such as ill-health and layoff shocks,
we employ unemployment insurance in our model to construct a
complete market with frictions. Speciﬁcally, individuals can hedge
their unemployment risks perfectly by purchasing a fully personal-
ized insurance policy. Moreover, we assume that there are signiﬁ-
cant frictions in the market in order to deal with the current
market situation where it is hard to observe such insurance and
that the information on involuntary unemployment intensity is
transparent between the insurer and the policyholder in order to
prevent moral hazard problems.22.2. Wealth process and market completion
An individual chooses optimal policies consisting of a portfolio
process pt and a consumption process ct > 0. LetAðW0Þ be the set of
admissible policies with the following two conditions: an admissi-
ble policy ðct ;ptÞ 2 AðW0Þmust be a pair of F t-progressively-mea-
surable processes satisfying ct : X Rþ ! Rþ;
R t
0 csds <1 for all
tP 0 almost surely, and pt : X Rþ ! R;
R t
0 p
2
s <1 for all tP 0
almost surely. In case W0 6 0, we assume AðW0Þ ¼ ;.
An individual’s wealth process follows
dWt ¼
frWt þptðl rÞ  ct þ I ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞgdtþptrdBt ;
t < s^ sU ;
frWt þptðl rÞ  ctgdtþptrdBt ;
tP s^ sU ;
8>><>>:
ð1Þ
where s is the time of voluntary retirement, pt ¼ pðnÞt
 
16n6N
is the
dollar amount invested in the stock at time t, Wt is the potential
retirement wealth process, and ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞ stands for the
unemployment insurance premium and k denotes loading factor.3
An individual receives an income stream I per unit time during2 Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) study the potential welfare beneﬁts of unem-
ployment insurance with and without moral hazard problems. This study concludes
that the welfare beneﬁts of unemployment insurance are large in the absence of
moral hazard, but when there is sufﬁcient moral hazard the unemployment insurance
could have negative effect on the economy and cause welfare loss. Chiu and Karni
(1998) conclude that private information fails to provide unemployment insurance in
the private sector. However, Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) conclude that an economy
with risk-averse workers increases output even though moral hazard exists.
3 When value of k is zero, it indicates the insurance markets are sufﬁciently
competitive and the insurers do not require any additional premium to the actuarially
fair premium. If k is positive and very large, then an individual would be better off
bearing the whole involuntary unemployment risks rather than taking the insurance
policy to hedge the risks. We conjecture that there exists an upper bound of k, under
which she is willing to take the insurance policy. The upper bound could be calculated
by comparing two value functions with and without the insurance. As a matter of fact,
this paper is limited to solve the optimal retirement problem in the absence of
unemployment insurance, since unhedgeable involuntary unemployment risks make
it very difﬁcult. We leave it as an open problem.working status, while she does not when she enters voluntary retire-
ment or involuntary unemployment.
In this paper, the involuntary unemployment event occurs due
to health shocks and layoff shocks and it is assumed to be perma-
nent. Following standard literature, our model focuses on the im-
pact of permanent unemployment shocks on the individual’s
optimal policies. Viceira (2001) reports that temporary unemploy-
ment is not signiﬁcant for an individual’s optimal policies in that
she has the same optimal risky investment during working status
and transitory unemployment status.4 Some of existing literature
regarding labor income models permanent unemployment as zero
income with some probability. Cocco et al. (2005) introduce a disas-
trous labor income shock in their life-cycle model and consider zero
income with a 0.5% annual probability.
We assume that an individual can purchase personalized unem-
ployment insurance. We consider the non-negative process
ðWt WtÞ as the unemployment coverage at the involuntary
unemployment time bought for a reward of the premium rate
ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞ per unit time. In other words, the individual un-
der the unemployment insurance coverage pays ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞ
per unit time and receives a lump-sum payment of ðWt WtÞ at
the involuntary unemployment time.5 (Therefore, Wt ¼Wt for
tP s.) If involuntary unemployment takes place before the optimal
voluntary retirement time, the individual receives ðWt WtÞ and
thus her wealth level jumps up to Wt , the potential retirement
wealth level. After that time, she can reach the wealth level at retire-
ment Ws at s through the classical Merton’s (1969) policies. Evi-
dently, if an involuntary unemployment event does not occur
before s, she reaches the wealth level at retirement without any
lump-sum payments.
We can easily obtain the following two budget constraints:E
Z s^sU
0
HðtÞ ct  I þ kU Wt Wt
 þ k  dt
þHðs ^ sUÞWs^sU
	
6W0;
E
Z s^sU
t
HðsÞ cs  I þ kU Wt Wt
 þ k  ds
þHðs ^ sUÞWs^sU jHt
	
P 0; 80 6 t < s ^ sU :
ð2Þ
The ﬁrst constraint tells us that if individuals do not enter vol-
untary retirement and involuntary unemployment does not occur,
then the sum of expected discounted terminal wealth and the ex-
pected discounted total consumption minus income and the pre-
mium rate of the unemployment insurance including loading
factors cannot exceed the initial endowment. The following bor-
rowing constraint implies the second constraint of (2):Wt P 0; for all t P 0 almost surely:
This kind of borrowing constraint is typical because it is natural
not to allow individuals to have negative wealth at retirement. The
possibility of involuntary retirement prevents individuals from
borrowing money on credit at any time.4 According to Viceira (2001), a more realistic assumption of unemployment event
is to incorporate transition between employment and unemployment states through
a Markov regime-switching model. Taking into account the Markov regime-switching
model of labor income would be an interesting topic for future study. Further,
considering endogenous re-entering to the workforce after involuntary unemploy-
ment event would be another realistic assumption. We are grateful to the reviewer for
the comments about more realistic unemployment risk models.
5 Coles (2008) shows that the lump-sum layoff payment compensates workers
against their drop in permanent income though being laid off in optimal unemploy-
ment insurance.
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We consider an individual with the following time-additive
utility function:
Uðlt ; ctÞ ¼ 1a
ðl1at cat Þ1c

1 c ; c
 > 0; c – 1; and 0 < a < 1;
where ct is per period consumption and lt is leisure. We employ a
simple model for leisure that the individual enjoys leisure lt = l1 dur-
ing working and lt = l2(l1 6 l2) when she retires. Following FP, we let
c = 1  a(1  c⁄) and normalize to be l1 = 1. Then the utility prior to
retirement is
U1ðctÞ  Uð1; ctÞ ¼ c
1c
t
1 c :
Our problem is to ﬁnd the value function V(W0):
VðW0Þ¼ max
ðct ;pt ;Wt ;sÞ2AðW0Þ
E
Z s^sU
0
edtU1ðctÞdtþedðs^sU Þ
Z 1
s^sU
edðts^sU ÞUðl2;ctÞdt
 

ð3Þ
subject to (1), where d is an individual’s subjective discount rate.
We assume that V(W0) = 1 if AðW0Þ ¼ ;.
3. Solutions
3.1. Critical wealth level
Let
U2ðWs^sU Þ ¼ maxðct ;ptÞ2AðW0ÞE
Z 1
s^sU
edðts^sU ÞUðl2; ctÞdt
 

:
When s = s ^ sU, we rewrite U2ðWs^sU Þ as
U2ðWsÞ ¼ maxðct ;pt Þ2AðW0ÞE
Z 1
s
edðtsÞUðl2; ctÞdt
 

:
Then, U2 follows6
U2ðWtÞ ¼ KW
1c
t
1 c ;
where K ¼ l1a2
 1c
1
b
 c
; b ¼ c1c r þ h
2
2c
 
þ dc. By the principle of
dynamic programming, we rewrite the value function V(W0) as
following:
VðW0Þ ¼ max
ðct ;pt ;Wt ;sÞ2AðW0Þ
E
Z s^sU
0
edtU1ðctÞdt þ edðs^sU ÞU2ðWs^sU Þ
 

:
Finding the optimal voluntary retirement time is to determine
the potential retirement wealth level Ws at the voluntary retire-
ment time, called the critical wealth level, at which individual’s util-
ity loss stemming from income loss is equivalent to her utility gain
due to the increase of leisure. The individual could enjoy a more
leisure after retirement than that during working, while they no
longer get income after retirement. If individual’s current wealth
level is lower than the critical wealth level, or equivalently
Wt < Ws, then it is optimal to enter voluntary retirement as soon
as the wealth process touches the critical wealth level. Otherwise,
it is optimal to enter voluntary retirement immediately.
According to FP, choosing a retirement time is deciding an exer-
cise time of an American-type option. In their framework, individ-
uals with the retirement option could enjoy more leisure in
compensation for giving up their income. Our model would show6 See Merton (1969) for the dynamic programming approach, and Chapter 3 of
Karatzas and Shreve (1998) for the martingale approach.different features because we allow the possibility of involuntary
retirement. The retirement option is a kind of option to choose a
retirement time, which is only cancelable by the outbreak of exog-
enous events. Therefore, the involuntary unemployment intensity
kU could have a signiﬁcant impact on the critical wealth level
and the following theorem veriﬁes this intuition.
For further analysis, let n1 and n2 be constants such that
n1;2 ¼
1 2 dr
h2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 2 dr
h2
 2
þ 8 dþkU
h2
r
2
:Theorem 3.1. The critical wealth level Ws :¼W isW ¼ K1cZ1c;
where
Z
1
c ¼ K1cC1c I  k
r þ kU
 ðn1  n2Þ  ðn1  1ÞCn21 þ ðn2  1ÞCn11
n o.
1þ kUK
1
c
 n
 1
bþ kU ðn1  n2ÞC
1c  ðn1  1Þ þ 1c
 
Cn21

þ ðn2  1Þ þ 1c
 
Cn11

K1cC1cðn1  n2Þ
o
;
Z ¼ CZ; C 2 ð0;1Þ and C is the solution of the following nonlinear
equation
1þ kUK1c
 
C
1
cZ
1
c
1
bþ kU n2 n1
c
c 1 1
 
 n2ðn1  1Þ I  kr þ kU
þK1cC1cZ1cn2 n1 c1cþ 1
 
¼ Cn21 1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþ kU ðn1  1Þ þ
1
c
 
Cn21ðn1  1Þ IkrþkU :Proof. Proposition A.3 in Appendix A.3 completes the proof. h
Notice that the individual considered in our model has to
pay the insurance premium to hedge the forced unemployment
risks, and thereby goes through a reduction of income. A higher
involuntary unemployment intensity and a higher loading factor
drive up the insurance premium, and the premium increase
would deteriorate her wealth condition. Therefore, when facing
a higher involuntary unemployment intensity and a higher
loading factor, it might be optimal for her to take a lower crit-
ical wealth level to enter the voluntary retirement before an
involuntary unemployment shock arrives. This relationship
among critical wealth level, involuntary unemployment inten-
sity, and loading factor turns out to be true in Section 6 for
some reasonable parameters.
3.2. Optimal consumption
Theorem 3.2. Let C1 and C2 be constants such that
C1 ¼
1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU ðn2  1Þ þ 1c
 
 ðn2  1Þ IkrþkU
n1ðn2  n1ÞZn11
;
C2 ¼
1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU ðn1  1Þ þ 1c
 
 ðn1  1Þ IkrþkU
n2ðn1  n2ÞZn21
:
The optimal consumption process ct = c(W0) prior to retirement is
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1
c;
where k⁄(W0) is the solution of the following equation:
n1C1ðkðW0ÞÞn11 þ n2C2ðkðW0ÞÞn21
 1þ kUK1c
  1
bþ kU ðk
ðW0ÞÞ
1
c þ I  k
r þ kU þW0
¼ 0: ð4ÞProof. Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.3 completes the proof. h
If we remove n1C1ccð1n1Þt  n2C2ccð1n2Þt from (4), which is the
option of voluntary retirement in the presence of unemployment
risks and the borrowing constraint, then the optimal consumption
process will be
ct ¼ bþ kU
1þ kUK1c
  W0 þ I  kr þ kU
 
: ð5Þ
ct in (5) is the optimal consumption of an individual that receives an
income stream (I  k) where she cannot retire voluntarily but could
retire involuntarily. Notice that a simple afﬁne relation between
wealth and consumption holds, which is common in conventional
Merton-type problems with constant incomes and involuntary
unemployment shocks. By contrast, the optimal consumption pro-
cess in Theorem 3.2 shows a nonlinear relation between wealth
and consumption. Furthermore, the optimal consumption in our
model is affected by both the involuntary unemployment intensity,
kU, and loading factors, k. Concerning these parameters, we can say
that, under the conventional Merton set-up described above, a lar-
ger unemployment intensity reduces an individual’s consumption
and so does a larger loading factor.
3.3. Optimal portfolioTheorem 3.3. The optimal wealth process Wt given as
Wt ¼ n1C1 kYt edtHðtÞ
 n11  n2C2 kYt edtHðtÞ n21
þ 1þ kUK1c
  1
bþ kU k
Yt e
dtHðtÞ 1c  I  k
r þ kU ð6Þ
is self-ﬁnanced by ct ¼ kYt edtHðtÞ
 1c , and the optimal portfolio pro-
cess pt prior to retirement is
pt ¼ hr
1
c
W0 þ I  kr þ kU
 
þ n1C1 kðW0Þð Þn11 ðn1  1Þ þ 1c
 
þ n2C2 kðW0Þð Þn21 ðn2  1Þ þ 1c
 
: ð7Þ7 Using numerical experiments, we found that this is possible under a wide range
of reasonable parameter conditions.Proof. See Appendix A.4 for the proof. h
The ﬁrst term of our optimal portfolio in (7) represents Merton’s
optimal portfolio with constant incomes (I  k) in the presence of
unemployment risks, whereas the second and third terms are asso-
ciated with the voluntary retirement options and borrowing con-
straints. The optimal portfolio in our model becomes that of FP
when both involuntary unemployment intensity and loading fac-
tors disappear i.e., kU = 0 and k = 0.
The presented results hint at how involuntary unemployment
intensity and loading factors affect the individual’s optimal risky
portfolio. According to FP, an individual tends to increase her
stockholdings when we compare with the stockholdings in the
classical Merton (1969) model if there are not involuntary unem-
ployment events and market frictions. However, it is ambiguous
whether involuntary unemployment or loading factors increase
the incentive to invest more in the stock market or not. In thisregard, our work provides new insights into the relations among
optimal stockholdings, involuntary unemployment, and loading
factors. The possibility of involuntary unemployment and the pres-
ence of loading factors may hamper the growth of individual’s
wealth. Thus, a larger involuntary unemployment intensity and a
higher loading factor may reduce stockholdings than the FP
investor.
Notice that Z 6 k 6 Z, n1 > 1, n2 < 0 and k⁄(W0) decreases to Z as
wealth W0 increases. Individuals enter voluntary retirement when
k⁄(W0) equals to Z. FP state that the tendency to take early retire-
ment is low when an individual has a small level of wealth (i.e.,
she is far from the critical wealth level at retirement). As shown
in FP, given the borrowing constraint of WtP 0, which makes
k⁄(W0) bounded above by Z, our optimal portfolio has both
C1ðkðW0ÞÞn11 and C2ðkðW0ÞÞn21. However, C1ðkðW0ÞÞn11 and
C2ðkðW0ÞÞn21 in FP have nothing to do with involuntary unem-
ployment intensity and loading factor, whereas we do.
If k⁄(W0) is sufﬁciently small, then the absolute value of
C2ðkðW0ÞÞn21 will be much larger than that of C1ðkðW0ÞÞn11.
Therefore, if C2 is positive, the third term n2C2ðkðW0ÞÞn21
ððn2  1Þ þ 1=cÞ of (7) will be positive and non-negligible under
some parameter conditions with a large unemployment intensity
kU.7 Thus, an individual with a high chance of involuntary unemploy-
ment and the borrowing constraint may invest much more in a stock
as her wealth level approaches the critical wealth level (which is
very low in this case), even though she is very poor. According to
the traditional rule of investment including FP, the young invest
more in the stock markets than do the old, because the young have
a greater human capital risk to be hedged by stock investment. How-
ever, under the case discussed above, we can state that older people
that face a bigger involuntary unemployment risk may take an opti-
mal risky investment policy in contrast to the traditional rule.
The loading factor kmay also have a large impact on an individ-
ual’s stockholdings. As seen in (1), we can think of a larger loading
factor as a continuous and constant income loss. Thus, an insurance
market with a large loading factor may negatively affect an indi-
vidual’s optimal stockholdings, and this partially explains the rea-
sons for empirical observations such as the moderate equity
holdings puzzle.
4. Time and probability of retirement
This section introduces useful methods for calculating expected
time to retirement and the probability of voluntary retirement.
Using these concepts, we can describe the relationship between
expected time to retirement and an individual’s optimal behavior,
and the link between the probability change of voluntary retire-
ment and wealth level in subsequent sections.
4.1. Expected time to retirement
A natural deﬁnition of the expected time to retirement might be
TðWÞ  E½s ^ sU jWt ¼W ¼ E
Z s
0
ekUtdtjWt ¼W
 

; where s
¼ inffsP t P 0jWs ¼Wg:
Then Ito’s formula and the martingale property of
ekUtTðWtÞ þ
Z t
0
ekUsds
Fig. 1. Optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of wealth level in a competitive unemployment insurance market. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption and
portfolio of three models in a competitive unemployment insurance market: voluntary retirement without borrowing constraints (dotted line), voluntary retirement with
borrowing constraints (solid line), and involuntary retirement with borrowing constraints (thick solid line). Parameter values are as follows: kU = 0.0423. k = 0, r = 0.03,
l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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equation (ODE) with two boundary conditions TðWÞ ¼ 0 and
T0(0) = 0:
1
1
2
r2W2T 00ðWÞ þ frW þ pðl rÞ  c þ IgWT 0ðWÞ
 kUTðWÞ þ 1 ¼ 0; ð8Þ
where p and c depend on wealth level W. However, it is difﬁcult to
solve the ODE of (8) analytically.
We can newly deﬁne the voluntary retirement time by utilizing
the state process Zt, which is evolved by
dZt
Zt
¼ ðd rÞdt  hdBt ; Z0 ¼ k > 0; Z < Zt < Z: ð9Þ
Actually, the voluntary retirement time s becomes
s = inf{sP tP 0jZs = Z}. The expected time to retirement T(Z) is
TðZÞ ¼ E
Z s
0
ekUtdtjZt ¼ Z
 

;
and T(Z) is the solution to the following second order linear ODE
with boundary conditions T(Z) = 0 and T 0ðZÞ ¼ 0:
1
2
h2Z2T 00ðZÞ þ ðd rÞZT 0ðZÞ  kUTðZÞ þ 1 ¼ 0: ð10ÞTheorem 4.1. The expected time to retirement T is
TðZÞ ¼ m2Z
m1
ðCm2m1  Cm1m2ÞkU
Zm1 þ m1Z
m2
Cm1m2  Cm2m1
 
kU
Zm2 þ 1
kU
;where
m1;2 ¼ 1 2 d r
h2
 

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 2 d r
h2
 2
þ 8 kU
h2
s8<:
9=;=2:Proof. See Appendix A.5 for the proof. h
Intuitively, as involuntary unemployment intensity kU drops to
zero, expected time to retirement should increase. In this regard,
expected time to retirement in our model should be shorter than
that in FP. An individual with involuntary unemployment risks is
likely to enter voluntary retirement earlier by lowering the critical
wealth level, at which she wants to retire in order to avoid incur-
ring the costs of those involuntary unemployment risks.
Note that we can obtain expected time to retirement in FP with
borrowing constraints, where involuntary unemployment risk is
not considered, by substituting kU = 0 into (10) and newly solving
the second-order linear ODE. Thus, expected time to retirement
in FP is a special case of that in this paper.
4.2. Probability of voluntary retirement
We can compute the probability that individuals enter volun-
tary retirement before involuntary unemployment by using ﬁrst
passage time of Zt in (9).
Theorem 4.2. Consider the time of voluntary retirement
s = inf{tP 0jZt = Z}. Then P[s < sU] can be obtained by computing
the following double integral
Fig. 2. Optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of wealth level in an uncompetitive unemployment insurance market. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption and
portfolio of three models in an uncompetitive unemployment insurance market: voluntary retirement without borrowing constraints (dotted line), voluntary retirement with
borrowing constraints (solid line), and involuntary retirement with borrowing constraints (thick solid line). Parameter values are as follows: kU = 0.0423, k = 0.1, r = 0.03,
l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
Fig. 3. Critical wealth level as a function of involuntary unemployment intensity. The
ﬁgure presents the critical wealth level of three models in an uncompetitive unemploy-
ment insurance market: voluntary retirement without borrowing constraints (dotted
line), voluntary retirement with borrowing constraints (solid line), and involuntary
retirementwith borrowing constraints (thick solid line). Parameter values are as follows:
kU = 0.0423, k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
8 The voluntary retirement model without borrowing constraints (with borrowing
constraints) is corresponding to the model in FP without borrowing constraints (the
model in DL when mortality risks go away). Moreover, the voluntary retirement
model without borrowing constraints would be the model of FP with borrowing
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0
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2pt3
p
 exp 
 1h ln Zk  d r  12 h2
 
1
h t
 2
2t
0B@
1CAdtkUekUsds:constraints.Proof. See Appendix A.6 for the proof. h5. Optimal behaviors in a competitive unemployment insurance
market
We analyze consumption and portfolio effects incurred from
both voluntary retirement and involuntary unemployment, by
comparing our model with two models of voluntary retirement,
not involuntary unemployment. Particularly, this section shows
an individual’s optimal behavior with a fairly priced insurance in
the market. This would be possible when the unemployment insur-
ance market is sufﬁciently competitive and thereby has no fric-
tions. Then, insurance companies might not require additional
costs k.
The baseline parameters are the following: N = 1,r = 0.03,
d = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, and c = 4. In addition, K1/cb and kU are
set as 0.5 and 0.0423, respectively. The value of involuntary unem-
ployment intensity kU in the baseline parameters represents layoff
shock. Following related papers dealing with life-cycle models, we
utilize baseline parameters in a competitive unemployment insur-
ance and explain the detailed calibration method of the parameter
in Section 6.2.1. We have two models for the case of voluntary
retirement: voluntary retirement without borrowing constraints
and voluntary retirement with borrowing constraints.8 The volun-
Fig. 4. Optimal consumption as a function of expected time to retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption of individuals in a good health condition (A, dotted line)
and in a bad health condition (B, solid line). Parameter values are as follows: k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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kU = 0, in our model. Fig. 1 shows the optimal consumption and port-
folio of individuals with different wealth levels for the baseline
parameters.
Fig. 1(a) demonstrates that all of the three cases increase
consumption before retirement but there is a sudden fall in
consumption at retirement, and then optimal consumption lies
on the Merton line after retirement. However, one can see that
both amounts of consumption in models of involuntary and vol-
untary retirement with borrowing constraints are lower than
those in the model of voluntary retirement without borrowing
constraints. Our model considers the case where an individual
can lose her job involuntarily but cannot borrow money on
credit. When an individual has positive involuntary unemploy-
ment intensity, she tends to take a lower consumption before
her retirement in an attempt to increase wealth for involuntary
unemployment. Notice that as wealth level decreases, the differ-
ence between the two voluntary retirement models increases.
This is consistent with the intuition that poorer individuals
are usually more conservative in consumption when they face
the borrowing constraint.
Next, Fig. 1(b) shows that optimal stockholdings in our mod-
el are much smaller than those in two voluntary retirement
models. Involuntary unemployment risks could have a signiﬁ-cant impact on individuals; thus, they dramatically decrease
their stockholdings as these risks increase. Moreover, the
amount of stockholdings in the voluntary retirement model
without borrowing constraints is still lower than that in the
voluntary retirement model with borrowing constraints. One
interesting observation is that our model has the steepest slope
near the optimal retirement wealth level before retirement. This
implies that an individual might dramatically increase her
stockholdings in the short-term to enter voluntary retirement
when faced with involuntary unemployment risks and the bor-
rowing constraint.
6. Optimal behaviors in an uncompetitive unemployment
insurance market
This section presents an individual’s optimal behavior when the
market price and actuarially fair price are different. By assuming
positive values of k, we reﬂect that individuals cannot trade unem-
ployment insurance at the actuarially fair price because of the
underdevelopment of the unemployment insurance market.
Accordingly, the insurer requires an additional premium k on top
of the actuarially fair premium.
We utilize the baseline parameters suggested in the previous
section except that we choose 10% of I = 1 for the value of k instead
Fig. 5. Optimal consumption as a function of expected time to retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption of individuals in a large ﬁrm (A, dotted line) and in a
small ﬁrm (B, solid line). Parameter values are as follows: k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
B.-G. Jang et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3585–3604 3593of k = 0. We also consider optimal policies for various parameters
and provide implications from the numerical results. Speciﬁcally,
we carry out a sensitivity analysis using the different ranges and
values of kU, involuntary unemployment intensity; k, loading fac-
tor; and K1/cb, leisure. Analyzing the sensitivity of the critical
wealth level, optimal consumption, and optimal portfolio in spe-
ciﬁc ranges of each parameter can provide various economic in-
sights into the moderate equity holdings puzzle, the retirement-
consumption puzzle, and other economic issues.9
6.1. Baseline case
Fig. 2 shows an individual’s optimal consumption and portfolio
for the baseline parameters when the price of unemployment
insurance is higher than the actuarially fair price. We employ the
loading factor k to reﬂect market uncompetitiveness: for the base
case, we assume k = 10% of income rate I = 1.9 The retirement-consumption puzzle is one of economic observations that
households expenditure declines during retirement. Banks et al. (1998) argue that
there are unanticipated shocks occurring around retirement date and that these
shocks might be one of the reasons for the retirement-consumption puzzle. Following
Banks et al. (1998), Smith (2006) ﬁnds a link between unanticipated wealth shocks
and early retirement in order to explain the retirement-consumption puzzle.As expected from the previous section, both amounts of con-
sumption (stockholdings) in the models of involuntary and vol-
untary retirement with borrowing constraints are lower than
that in the model of voluntary retirement without borrowing
constraints. However, the optimal amount of consumption
(stockholdings) in a competitive market, as shown in Fig. 1, is
higher than that in a relatively less competitive market, as
shown in Fig. 2. The gap follows from the fact that positive load-
ing factors reduce the wealth level and decrease the level of con-
sumption (stockholdings).
6.2. Implications
We illustrate some results for different values of parameters
within realistically calibrated ranges. Before examining each case
in detail, we present the range of three parameters: involuntary
unemployment intensity, kU; loading factor, k; and leisure, K1/cb.
6.2.1. Parameter values
6.2.1.1. Involuntary unemployment intensity. Involuntary unem-
ployment accompanied by a negative wealth shock might play a
crucial role for individuals deciding their optimal policies. On the
basis of the ﬁndings in HRS questionnaires, Lachance and Seligman
Fig. 6. Optimal portfolio as a function of expected time to retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal portfolio of individuals in a good health condition (A, dotted line) and in a
bad health condition (B, solid line). Parameter values are as follows: k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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status10 give the following reasons for involuntary retirement: poor
health (43.6%), laid off/let go and business closed (21.2% and 10.9%,
respectively). Smith (2006) also documents similar reasons for
involuntary retirements before the state pension age of 65.11
In order to quantify the degree of involuntary unemployment,
we focus our analysis on retirement caused by ill-health and lay-
offs due to ﬁrm closure. Since the involuntary unemployment is
permanent in our model, it is involuntary retirement. In a model-
ing point of view, the permanent unemployment assumption is
consistent with that in well-known papers such as Viceira
(2001) and Cocco et al. (2005). Empirically, Smith (2006) provides
a chart regarding employment status prior to retirement, in
which about 40% of retirees go into retirement state from non-
working state. There are many studies stressing the importance10 In our model, an involuntarily unemployed person is regarded as an involuntary
retiree, namely she directly enters involuntary retirement when an unemployment
shock arrives.
11 Smith (2006) uses data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and
reports that main reasons for voluntary and involuntary retirement might be
different. Voluntary retirees seem to retire because of offered reasonable ﬁnancial
terms (36.0%) and to enjoy life while young and ﬁt (20.0%), while involuntary retirees
cite own ill-health (48.5%) and redundant/dismissed/no choice (27.3%).of the effects of health shocks on an individual’s behavior in
retirement (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2008; Lachance and Seligman,
2008; Smith, 2006). Moreover, we see that ﬁrm closure might
cause permanent layoffs. Permanent layoffs would be more plau-
sible especially when an individual works in a smaller ﬁrm. Mor-
issette (2004) reports that most permanent layoff rates in small
ﬁrms from 1983 to 1999 were three times higher than those in
large ﬁrms. Similarly, Picot (1992) mentions importance of ﬁrm
size in determining layoff rates and documents that permanent
layoffs often occur in small ﬁrms.12 We use two sources of data
to calibrate health and layoff shocks: the HRS and the historical
corporate default rates.
First, we estimate kU relating to health issues. Because there is
no direct way to do so, we use the results of Dwyer and Mitchell
(1999) to measure the intensity of involuntary unemployment12 We thank the reviewer for pointing that the unemployment due to bankruptcy of
ﬁrms could be temporary, not permanent. Based on the permanent layoff analysis in
Morissette (2004) and Picot (1992), we specify that individuals in our model who
experienced layoffs are working in small ﬁrms and assume that the layoffs are
resulted from ﬁrm closure. In order to calibrate the unemployment intensity, we
relate ﬁrm closure of small ﬁrms to the default of speculative-grade ﬁrms, since many
studies ﬁnd that there is a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and credit ratings
(Blume et al., 1998; Amato and Furﬁne, 2004; Avramov et al., 2009).
Fig. 7. Optimal portfolio as a function of expected time to retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal portfolio of individuals in a large ﬁrm (A, dotted line) and in a small ﬁrm (B,
solid line). Parameter values are as follows: k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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HRS, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) report the expected retirement
age of full-time workers depending on their health status: good
health and bad heath. Therefore, we can estimate the intensity of
involuntary retirement owing to ill-health, by using years of sur-
vival in employment for each health status conditional on working
at age 57, under the assumption of our model that the time to
involuntary unemployment follows an exponential distribution.
On the basis of the expected retirement age, we consider the value
kU to be 0.1205 for the good health status and 0.1786 for the bad
health status.
The second factor we choose to estimate involuntary unem-
ployment intensity is permanent layoffs owing to ﬁrm closure.
We basically consider unemployment risks of individuals in small
ﬁrms facing default risks, and employing unemployment risks of
individuals working in large ﬁrms for comparison.13 We calibrate
the default intensity of ﬁrms with different credit ratings based on13 While we calibrate unemployment intensity of individuals in large ﬁrms using
default rates of investment-grade ﬁrms, the unemployment intensity (0.0029) is close
to zero. This implies that she has a chance to be unemployed once in 345 years on
average, and thus when she goes through unemployment, it is almost same as the
permanent retirement.the average cumulative issuer-weighted global default rates by rat-
ing category from 1983 to 2009 in Emery et al. (2010). Notice that
in our calibration of the intensity, the distribution of the default rate
follows an exponential distribution. On the basis of the historical
data, we select two categories of speculative-grade and invest-
ment-grade ﬁrms to calibrate unemployment intensity of an individ-
ual working in a small ﬁrm (0.0423) and a large ﬁrm (0.0029).
6.2.1.2. Loading factors. We choose the value of k to be 10%, 20%,
and 50% of income rate.
6.2.1.3. Leisure. FP introduce K1/cb to control the shift in the mar-
ginal utility of consumption upon entering retirement and they
calibrate value of K1/cb from the ratio of the consumptions imme-
diately prior to and after retirement. We use the values from FP: K1/
cb are 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7.
6.2.2. Involuntary unemployment intensity
Fig. 3 shows the critical wealth levelW as a function of involun-
tary unemployment intensity. It shows that, ceteris paribus, the
critical wealth level decreases as involuntary unemployment
intensity increases. Notice that the two voluntary retirement mod-
els have different critical wealth levels because of the borrowing
Fig. 8. Optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of expected time to involuntary retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of
expected time to involuntary retirement with different values of loading factors. Parameter values are as follows: kU = 0.0423,W0 = 10, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03,
K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
3596 B.-G. Jang et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3585–3604constraint. When involuntary unemployment intensity is high, the
critical wealth level in our model is much less than that in volun-
tary retirement models. This result implies that individuals caring
about their involuntary unemployment might try to retire volun-
tarily much earlier than those who do not.
Figs. 4 and 5 present optimal consumption per total wealth
against expected time to retirement for four different values of
involuntary unemployment intensity: unemployment of individual
with good and bad health conditions (good health and bad health
cases) and unemployment of individual in large and small ﬁrms
(large ﬁrm and small ﬁrm cases). Recall that expected time to
retirement in Section 4 is the expectation of the minimum time
of voluntary retirement and involuntary unemployment. For in-
stance, when an individual is in a small ﬁrm, expected time to
involuntary retirement is approximately 1/kU = 23.64 years,
whereas expected time to retirement (including voluntary and
involuntary retirement) is approximately 19 years (see Fig. 5(b)).
In Fig. 5(a) and (b), the optimal consumption-wealth ratio in a
small ﬁrm case is less than that in a large ﬁrm case. However, an
individual working for a small ﬁrm reduces her consumption-
wealth ratio more rapidly than does one working for a large ﬁrm,
as seen in Fig. 5(c). An individual in a large ﬁrm has already signif-
icantly reduced her consumption amount when her expected time
to retirement is greater than 19 years, while an individual in a
small ﬁrm has just started to consume less. We ﬁnd the similar re-
sults when we compare individuals in good and bad health condi-
tions, as seen in Fig. 4.We can observe the retirement-consumption puzzle, a fall in
consumption during retirement, in Figs. 4 and 5. Our model ex-
plains this by the fact that consumption and leisure can be substi-
tutes for an individual’s utility. This is consistent with the analysis
of consumption jumps in DL, in the sense that our model also con-
siders forward-looking individuals and predictable retirement
date. One other noteworthy factor is that the initial consump-
tion-wealth ratio is different for each unemployment intensity:
0.09 (good health case), 0.08 (bad health case), 0.13 (large ﬁrm
case) and 0.10 (small ﬁrm case). However, the decline in the con-
sumption-wealth ratio as retirement date approaches seemingly
converges to 0.04(=0.07  0.03) regardless of the degree of unem-
ployment intensity. Morevoer, as documented in Banks et al.
(1998), when there are changes in an individual’s peer group be-
cause of illness or bad health, a reducing consumption-wealth ratio
is more noticeable. In Fig. 4, if an individual with good health sud-
denly becomes ill, which means her health status changes to bad
health (and the initial consumption level of 0.09 is unchanged),
then she reduces her consumption-wealth ratio near retirement
date more (0.09  0.03 = 0.06) than an individual with long-term
bad health (0.08  0.03 = 0.05). When an individual’s health deteri-
orates, it could be natural that she needs to prepare her voluntary
retirement by reducing consumption more rapidly.
Figs. 6 and 7 present optimal stockholdings per total wealth
against the expected time to retirement for different levels of
involuntary unemployment intensity. When it comes to the effect
of involuntary unemployment intensity on optimal stockholdings,
Fig. 9. Optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of wealth level. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of wealth level with different
values of loading factors. Parameter values are as follows: kU = 0.0423, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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young people and also the U-shaped pattern. The result is consis-
tent with empirical results of stockholding in Table IV of Heaton
and Lucas (2000) reporting portfolio shares relative to ﬁnancial as-
sets by age group, in which they observe U-shaped pattern for the
years 1989 and 1995 and increasing stockholding pattern for the
year 1992.
Traditionally, older people prepare for voluntary retirement by
reducing their stockholdings, whereas the young tend to invest
more in the stock market. When involuntary unemployment inten-
sity is low (see Fig. 7(a)), we can observe that our model follows
the traditional investment rule. This result is consistent with the
ﬁndings in FP.
By contrast, our model shows a U-shaped pattern in the pres-
ence of high involuntary unemployment intensity. Figs. 6 and
7(b) depict the U-shaped curves of optimal stockholdings when
involuntary unemployment intensity has a high value. In such a
case, it is possible that old people invest more in the stock market
than young people do. Notice that an individual in a small ﬁrm
whose expected time to retirement is 19 years starts to rapidly re-
duce her stockholdings, but as retirement approaches, she sharply
increases them in order to avoid involuntary unemployment. Intu-
itively, this result is typical in that an individual with high involun-
tary unemployment intensity has a large incentive to invest more
because it is a certain way of entering voluntary retirement. DL
show that this ﬁnding holds when the income of an individual is
highly volatile and positively correlated with market risk. Accord-
ing to DL, individuals whose incomes are highly sensitive to themarket tend to invest more in the stock even though they are close
to retirement time. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Heaton
and Lucas (2000) that imminent retirees increase their
stockholdings.
On the other hand, our model can provide partial reasoning for
the moderate equity holdings puzzle. Bodie et al. (1992) mention
that occupational status tied to low wage risks could be linked to
risk-taking investment behavior, when the occupation is correlated
with market movements. Their ﬁnding seems to imply that people
engaging in occupations with a higher wage risk would have a ten-
dency to take lower risk-taking behavior, or hold stocks moder-
ately. The involuntary unemployment intensity kU in our model
characterized by health shocks and layoff shocks intuitively ac-
counts for this idea without correlation assumption between
wages and ﬁnancial market movements. Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate
that the higher involuntary unemployment intensity, the lower
stockholdings. In particular, when comparing Figs. 6(b) and 7(a),
when involuntary unemployment intensity is very high (Fig. 6(b),
kU = 0.2; Fig. 7(a), kU = 0.0029), individuals reduce their stockhold-
ings to less than 50%.6.2.3. Loading factor
Fig. 8(a) presents optimal consumption per total wealth against
expected time to retirement for various values of k. Obviously, a
high loading factor reduces the amount of consumption. Fig. 8(b)
depicts optimal stockholdings per total wealth as a function of ex-
pected time to retirement. It shows that, for a ﬁxed expected time
Fig. 10. Optimal consumption and portfolio as a function of expected time to retirement. The ﬁgure presents optimal consumption and portfolio with different values of
leisure. Parameter values are as follows: kU = 0.0423, W0 = 10, k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4, d = 0.03, and I = 1.
Fig. 11. Probability of voluntary retirement as a function of wealth level. The ﬁgure
presents probability of voluntary retirement as a function of wealth level of four
models: from top to bottom, individuals in a large ﬁrm (kU = 0.0029, dashed line)
and in a small ﬁrm (kU = 0.0423, solid line), individuals in a good health
(kU = 0.1205, middle thick solid line) and in a bad health (kU = 0.1786, thick solid
line). Parameter values are as follows: k = 0.1, r = 0.03, l = 0.07, r = 0.2, c = 4,
d = 0.03, K1/cb = 0.5, and I = 1.
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k increases. This fact seems to support the notion that uncompet-
itive market conditions hamper an individual’s risky investments
to solve the moderate equity holdings puzzle.Fig. 9(a) shows optimal consumption per total wealth against
wealth level and, as expected from Fig. 8(a), individuals reduce
the ratio for higher loading factors. Fig. 9(b) presents optimal
stockholdings per total wealth against wealth level. Similar to
Fig. 8(b), Fig. 9(b) also provides evidence of solving the moderate
equity holdings puzzle. Notice that, as the loading factor increases,
individuals whose wealth levels are sufﬁciently lower than the
critical wealth level take less stockholdings. By contrast, our model
captures the fact that imminent retirees have a strong motivation
to increase their portfolio returns; thus, they invest more into stock
even though they have higher loading factors.
6.2.4. Leisure
As documented in FP, K1/cb represents a post-/pre-retirement
consumption ratio, i.e., cþs^sU=c

s^sU and is related to the leisure l2
after retirement. The quantity K1/cb has a smaller value as l2
increases.
Fig. 10 demonstrates how leisure demand affects optimal con-
sumption and investment, namely that higher leisure demand im-
plies larger consumption and stockholdings.
6.3. Probability of voluntary retirement
Fig. 11 presents the probability of an individual with good and
bad health conditions entering voluntary retirement (good health
and bad health cases), and individuals who are working for large
and small ﬁrms entering voluntary retirement (large ﬁrm and
small ﬁrm cases). As expected, individuals that have low involun-
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voluntary retirement. When an individual is close to retirement
time, this probability increases more rapidly as she has higher
unemployment intensity. This fact might explain why individuals
with higher unemployment risks have a tendency to increase their
stockholdings near retirement date.
7. Conclusion
Whether retirement is voluntary or involuntary, considering the
type of retirement is possible and this plays a crucial role in how
individuals decide on their optimal policies. This paper investigates
the optimal retirement of an individual in the presence of involun-
tary unemployment risks and borrowing constraints. We complete
the market by assuming that individuals mitigate involuntary
unemployment risks by purchasing personalized unemployment
insurance. We also consider market frictions through the concept
of loading factors in order to reﬂect the economic consensus that
current unemployment insurance markets are thin.
Using reasonably calibrated parameters, we observe that high
involuntary unemployment intensity could be an important expla-
nation for the moderate equity holdings puzzle and could support
the empirical ﬁndings of Heaton and Lucas (2000) including the U-
shaped patterns of an individual’s optimal stockholdings. In partic-
ular, when considering loading factors together with involuntary
unemployment intensity, the features of moderate equity holdings
are more noticeable for higher loading factors. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that an individual whose leisure demand is high after retirement
reduces consumption during retirement and increases stockhold-
ings as retirement time approaches.
An interesting extension of our model is giving a correlation
structure between the arrival intensity of involuntary unemploy-
ment events and market risks. One could do this by employing a
stochastically-changing arrival intensity of involuntary unemploy-
ment events. Taking this assumption, a negative correlation be-
tween the arrival intensity and market risks might sharpen the
U-shaped patterns of an individual’s optimal stockholdings.Acknowledgements
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A.1. Actuarially fair premium
Wewant to verify that the actuarially fair premium of an unem-
ployment insurance is kUðWt WtÞ. The veriﬁcation follows from
checking the following equality holds:
E
Z s^sU
0
HðtÞkU Wt Wt
 
dt
 

¼ E Hðs ^ sUÞ Ws^sU Ws^sU
  	
:
ð11ÞThe left hand side denotes the expected discounted total pre-
mium of kU Wt Wt
 
per unit time, and the right hand side repre-
sents the expected discounted total coverage of an unemployment
insurance at time 0. If we check Eq. (11) holds, then we can verify
that kU Wt Wt
 
is the actuarially fair premium of an unemploy-
ment at time t. We can rewrite the left hand side of Eq. (11) as the
following by some elementary calculations:
E
Z s^sU
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 
dt
 

¼E
Z 1
0
kUekUs
Z s^s
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 
dtds
 

¼E
Z s
0
kUekUs
Z s
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 
dtds

þ
Z s
1
kUekUs
Z s
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 
dtds


¼E
Z s
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 Z s
t
kUekUsdsdt

þ
Z s
0
HðtÞkU WtWt
 Z 1
s
kUekUsdsdt


¼E
Z s
0
ekUtHðtÞkU WtWt
 
dt
 

:
Similarly, the right hand side of Eq. (11) becomes
E Hðs ^ sUÞðWs^sU Ws^sU Þ
 	 ¼ E Z s
0
ekUtHðtÞkUðWt WtÞdt
 

:
Therefore, the Eq. (11) holds. h
A.2. Propositions
Proposition A.1. The value function V(W0) of (3) is
VðW0Þ¼ max
ðct ;pt ;Wt ;sÞ2AðW0Þ
E
Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt U1ðctÞþkUU2 Wt
  
dtþeðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ
 

;
where Wt denotes the potential retirement wealth process at time t.Proof. Applying the conditional expectation of sU gives the value
function V(W0) of (3).
E
R s^sU
0 e
dtU1ðctÞdt þ edðs^sU ÞU2ðWs^sU Þ
 	
¼ E E R s^sU0 edtU1ðctÞdt þ edðs^sU ÞU2ðWs^sU ÞjsU 	 	
¼ E R10 kUekUs R s^s0 edtU1ðctÞdtdsþ R10 kUekUsedðs^sÞU2ðWs^sÞds 	
¼ E R s0 kUekUs R s0 edtU1ðctÞdtdsþ R1s kUekUs R s0 edtU1ðctÞdtds
þ R s0 kUekUsedsU2ðWsÞdsþ R1s kUekUsedsU2ðWsÞds	
¼ E R s0 edtU1ðctÞ R st kUekUsdsdt þ R s0 edtU1ðctÞ R1s kUekUsdsdt
þ R s0 eðdþkU ÞskUU2ðWsÞdsþ eðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ	ðFubiniTheoremÞ
¼ E R s0 edtU1ðctÞ R1t kUekUsdsdt þ R s0 eðdþkU ÞskUU2ðWtÞdt
þeðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ
	
¼ E R s0 eðdþkU Þt U1ðctÞ þ kUU2ðWtÞ dt þ eðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ 	: 
Proposition A.2. The two budget constraints in (2) are possible to
rewrite as
E
Z s
0
ekUtHðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUWtÞdt þ ekUsHðsÞWs
 
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Z s
t
ekUsHðsÞ cs  I þ kþ kUWs
 
dsþ ekUsHðsÞWsjF t
 

P 0; 80
6 t < s:Proof. The proof about ﬁrst budget constraint is similar to the
proof of Proposition A.1.
Assume that Y is F t-measurable or bounded. For t < sU, we have
that
E½YsU jHt 1ft<sUg ¼
E½YsU1ft<sUgjF t 
E½1ft<sUgjF t 
1ft<sUg:
by Bayes’ rule. And
E½1ft<sUgjF t  ¼ P½sU > t ¼ ekUt :
E½YsU1ft<sUgjF t 1ft<sUg ¼ E E½YsU1ft<sUgjF1jF t
 	
1ft<sUg
¼ E½
Z 1
t
kUekUsYsdsjF t 1ft<sUg:
Then
E½YsU jHt 1ft<sUg ¼
E½R1t kUekUsYsdsjF t
ekUt
1ft<sUg:
Taking YsU ¼
R s^sU
t HðsÞ cðsÞ  I þ kþ kUWs
 
dsþ Hðs ^ sUÞWs^sU
and applying the conditional expectation of sU conclude the
proof. hA.3. Convex dual approach
A utility function is a concave, nondecreasing, upper semicon-
tinuous function U:R? [1,1) satisfying
(i) the half-line dom(U) , {x 2 R;U(x) > 1} is a nonempty sub-
set of [0,1),
(ii) U0 is continuous, positive, and strictly decreasing on the inte-
rior of dom(U), andU0ð1Þ , lim
x!1
U0ðxÞ ¼ 0:We set x , inffx 2 R;UðxÞ > 1g and deﬁne U0ðxþÞ , limx#xU0ðxÞ,
so that U0ðxÞ 2 ð0;1. The strictly decreasing, continuous function
U0 : ðx;1Þ ! ð0;U0ðxþÞÞ has a strictly decreasing, continuous in-
verse i : ð0;U0ðxþÞÞ ! ðx;1Þ. We set iðyÞ ¼ x for U0ðxþÞ 6 y 61,
so that i is deﬁned, ﬁnite, and continuous on the extended half-line
(0,1], and 0U0ðiðyÞÞ ¼ y; 0 < y < U ðxþÞ;
U0ðxþÞ; U0ðxþÞ 6 y 61;
iðU0ðxÞÞ ¼ x; x < x <1:The convex dual of U is the functioneUðyÞ , sup
x2R
fUðxÞ  xyg; y 2 R:Lemma A.1. The eU : R ! ð1;1 is convex, non-increasing, lower
semicontinuous, and satisﬁes
(i)eUðyÞ ¼ UðiðyÞÞ  yiðyÞ; y > 0;Uð1Þ , lim
x!1
UðxÞ; y ¼ 0;
1; y < 0:
8><>:(ii) The derivative eU 0 is deﬁned, continuous, and nondecreasing on
(0,1), andeU 0ðyÞ ¼ iðyÞ; 0 < y < 1:(iii) For all x 2 R,
UðxÞ ¼ inf
y2R
feUðyÞ þ xyg:(iv) For ﬁxed x 2 ðx;1Þ, the function y# eUðyÞ þ xy is uniquely
minimized over R by y = U0(x); i.e.UðxÞ ¼ eUðU0ðxÞÞ þ xU0ðxÞ:
Proof. See Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Chapter 3. h
The convex dual eU1ðkÞ of U1(ct) and eU2ðkÞ of U2(Wt) are
eU1ðkÞ ¼ c1c kc1c ;
eU2ðkÞ ¼ K1c c1c kc1c :
To determine the optimal consumption, portfolio process and
time to voluntary retirement we will apply the martingale ap-
proach to the value function V(W0).
Lemma A.2. For a ﬁxed stopping time s and deﬁneVsðW0Þ¼ max
ðct ;pt ;Wt Þ2AðW0Þ
E
Z s
0
eðdþkU ÞtfU1ðctÞþkUU2ðWtÞgdtþeðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ
 

;
and let
eJðYt ; k; sÞ ¼ E Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt eU1 kYtedtHðtÞ þ kU eU2 kYtedtHðtÞ n on
þ kYtekUtHðtÞI

dt þ eðdþkU Þs eU2ðkYsedsHðsÞÞ
For any s that is ﬁnite almost surely, there exists k⁄ such that
VsðW0Þ ¼ inffk>0;Yt>0g½
eJðYt ; k; sÞ þ kW0 ¼ eJ Yt ; k; s þ kW0:
and the optimal solution to V(W0) entails
Wt ¼ i2 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
; 80 6 t < s
Ws ¼ i2 kYt edsHðsÞ
 
;
ct ¼ i1 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
; 80 6 t 6 s;
where i1ðkÞ ¼ ðkÞ
1
c and i2ðkÞ ¼ K1cðkÞ
1
c for 0 < k <1. Moreover, the
value function V(W0) is
VðW0Þ ¼ sup
s
VsðW0Þ ¼ sup
s
inf
fk>0;Yt>0g
eJðYt ; k; sÞ þ kW0h i:Proof. For a ﬁxed stopping time s and any ðct ;ptÞ 2 AðW0Þ, deﬁne
JðW0;ct ;pt ;sÞ¼E
Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt U1ðctÞþkUU2ðWtÞ
 
dtþeðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ
 

:
Let kYt be a non-increasing process with Y0 = 1, k > 0. Assume
that Yt is absolutely continuous with respect to t, i.e., there is
wP 0 such that dYt = Ytwtdt. For details, see He and Pages
(1993). Next steps for the proof follows by the extended appendix
of FP. For any ðct ;ptÞ 2 AðW0Þ
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Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt U1ðctÞþkUU2 Wt
  
dtþeðdþkU ÞsU2ðWsÞ
 

6E
Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt eU1 kYtedtHðtÞ þkU eU2 kYtedtHðtÞ n odt
þeðdþkU Þs eU2 kYsedsHðsÞ i
þkE
Z s
0
YtekUtHðtÞ ct IþkUWt
 
dt

þ
Z s
0
YtekUtHðtÞIdtþekUsYsHðsÞWs


:
By integration by parts and Y0 = 1, we can rewriteR s
0 Yte
kUtHðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUWtÞdt asR s
0 Yte
kU tHðtÞðct IþkþkUWtÞdt
¼ R t0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsYt js0R s0 R t0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt
¼ R s0 ekU sHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsdsYsR s0 R st ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsdsdYt
R s0 R t0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYtþR s0 R st ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt
¼ R s0 ekU sHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsYsR s0 R s0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt
þR s0 R st ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt
¼ R s0 R s0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYtþR s0 ekU tHðtÞðct IþkþkUWtÞdt
R s0 R s0 ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYtþR s0 R st ekUsHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt
¼ R s0 ekU tHðtÞðct IþkþkUWtÞdtþR s0 R st ekU sHðsÞðcs IþkþkUWsÞdsdYt :
Then we obtain the following inequality for J(W0; ct, pt,s)
JðW0; ct ;pt ; sÞ
6 E
R s
0 e
ðdþkU Þt eU1 kYtedtHðtÞð Þ þ kU eU2 kYtedtHðtÞð Þn odth
þeðdþkU Þs eU2 kYsedsHðsÞð Þi
þkE R s0 ekUtHðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUWUt Þdth
þ R s0 R st ekUsHðsÞðcs  I þ kþ kUWsÞds
þekUsHðsÞWsgdYt
þ R s0 YtekUtHðtÞIdt þ ekUsHðsÞWs	
6 E
R s
0 e
ðdþkU Þt eU1 kYtedtHðtÞð Þ þ kU eU2 kYtedtHðtÞð Þn odth
þeðdþkU Þs eU2 kYsedsHðsÞð Þi
þkE R s0 ekUtHðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUWtÞdt
þekUsHðsÞWs þ kE
R s
0 Yte
kUtHðtÞIdt 	
þkE R s0 E R st ekUsHðsÞðcs  I þ kþ kUWsÞds
þekUsHðsÞWsjF tdYt
6 E
R s
0 e
ðdþkU Þt eU1 kYtedtHðtÞð Þ þ kU eU2 kYtedtHðtÞð Þ n odth
þeðdþkU Þs eU2 kYsedsHðsÞð Þi
þk W0 þ E
R s
0 Yte
kUtHðtÞIdt 	 ;
where the last inequality follows by the budget constraints
E
Z s
0
ekUtHðtÞ ct  I þ kþ kUWt
 
dt þ ekUsHðsÞWs
 

6W0;
E
Z s
t
ekUsHðsÞ cs  I þ kþ kUWs
 
dsþ ekUsHðsÞWsjF t
 

P 0;
80 6 t < s;
and dYt 6 0. Therefore, for any ﬁxed s, VsðW0Þ 6 inffk>0;Yt>0geJðYt; k; sÞ þ kW0h i and this inequality becomes equality ifWt ¼ i2 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
; 80 6 t < s
Ws ¼ i2 kYt edsHðsÞ
 
;
ct ¼ i1 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
; 80 6 t 6 s;
E
R s
0 e
kUtHðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUWtÞdt þ ekUsHðsÞWs
 	 ¼W0;
E
Z s
t
ekUsHðsÞ cs  I þ kþ kUWs
 
dsþ ekUsHðsÞWsjF t
 

¼ 0;
80 6 t 6 s;
where i1() is the inverse function of U01ðÞ and i2() is the inverse
function of U02ðÞ. Hence, we can obtain the value function V(W0)
by
VðW0Þ ¼ sup
s
VsðW0Þ ¼ sup
s
inf
fk>0;Yt>0g
eJðYt ; k; sÞ þ kW0h i: 
It is difﬁcult to apply Lemma A.2 to obtain an explicit optimal
solution. Thus, we divide the entire joint portfolio-consumption-
stopping problem of V(W0) into two problems through Karatzas
and Wang (2000) and He and Pages (1993). One is to minimizeeJðYt ; k; sÞ with Yt and the other is just a standard optimal stop-
ping problem. According to Karatzas and Wang (2000), inter-
changing sups and inffk>0;Yt>0g yields the following equality for
V(W0)
VðW0Þ ¼ sup
s
inf
fk>0;Yt>0g
eJðYt ; k; sÞ þ kW0h i
¼ inf
fk>0;Yt>0g
sup
s
eJðYt ; k; sÞ þ kW0h i ¼ inf
k>0
eV ðkÞ þ kW0h i;
whereeV ðkÞ , sup
s
inf
Yt>0
eJðYt ; k; sÞ
¼ inf
Yt>0
sup
s
eJðYt ; k; sÞ:Proposition A.3. eV ðkÞ follows
eV ðkÞ ¼ C1kn1 þ C2kn2  1þ kUK1c  cc 1 1bþ kU kc1c þ I  kr þ kU k;
if Z 6 k 6 Z;
eV ðkÞ ¼ c
1 cK
1
ck
c1
c
 
; if k 6 Z;
eV ðkÞ ¼ C1Zn1 þ C2Zn2  1þ kUK1c  cc 1 1bþ kU Zc1c þ I  kr þ kU Z;
if k > Z:
where
n1;2 ¼
1 2 dr
h2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 2 dr
h2
 2
þ 8 dþkU
h2
r
2
;
C1 ¼
1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU ðn2  1Þ þ 1c
 
 ðn2  1Þ IkrþkU
n1ðn2  n1ÞZn11
;
C2 ¼
1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU ðn1  1Þ þ 1c
 
 ðn1  1Þ IkrþkU
n2ðn1  n2ÞZn21
;
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1
c ¼ Ik
rþkU ðn1n2Þðn11ÞC
n21þðn21ÞCn11
n o
1þkUK1c
 h.
 1
bþkU ðn1n2ÞC
1c ðn11Þþ1c
 
Cn21

þ ðn21Þþ1c
 
Cn11

K1cC1cðn1n2Þ


;
Z¼CZ; C 2 ð0;1Þ:
The constant C is the solution of the following nonlinear equation
1þ kUK
1
c
 
C
1
cZ
1
c
1
bþ kU n2 n1
c
c 1 1
 
 n2ðn1  1Þ I  kr þ kU
þ K1cC1cZ1cn2ðn1 c1 cþ 1Þ
¼ Cn21 1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþ kU ðn1  1Þ þ
1
c
 
 Cn21ðn1  1Þ I  kr þ kU :Proof. Consider the process Z(t) = Zt = kYtedtH(t) with the following
stochastic differential equation
dZt
Zt
¼ dYt
Yt
þ ðd rÞdt  hdBt ; Z0 ¼ k > 0:
Then we can rewrite eV ðkÞ as
eV ðkÞ ¼ sup
s
E
Z s
0
eðdþkU Þt 1þ kUK1c
  c
1 c Z
c1
c
t þ IZt
 
dt

þ eðdþkU Þs c
1 cK
1
cZ
c1
c
s
 
In order to obtain eV ðkÞ we deﬁne
/ðZÞ ¼ sup
s
inf
Yt>0
eJðYt ; k; sÞh i ¼ inf
Yt>0
sup
s
eJðYt; k; sÞh i: ð12Þ
According to FP and He and Pages (1993), we construct the fol-
lowing variational inequality of /(Z)
ðdþ kUÞ/þ ðd rÞZ/Z þ
1
2
h2Z2/ZZ
þ 1þ kUK1c
  c
1 c Z
c1
c þ IZ
 
¼ 0; for Z 2 ðZ; ZÞ
/ðZÞP c
1 cK
1
cZ
c1
c
 
everywhere ðdþ kUÞ/þ ðd rÞZ/Z
þ 1
2
h2Z2/ZZ þ 1þ kUK
1
c
  c
1 c Z
c1
c þ IZ
 
6 0; for Z < Z
/Z <1 in ðZ; ZÞ;/ðZÞ is C2 a:e: and C1
/Z 6 0 everywhere
/Z ¼ 0 for Z 2 ðZ;1Þ
/(Z) satisfying the above variational inequality is /(Z) deﬁned in Eq.
(12). For the proof of this veriﬁcation theorem see the Theorem 3 in
He and Pages (1993).
In the continuation region Z 6 Z < Z, /(Z) satisﬁes the following
second-order ordinary differential equationðdþ kUÞ/þ ðd rÞZ/Z þ
1
2
h2Z2/ZZ
þ 1þ kUK1c
  c
1 c Z
c1
c þ IZ
 
¼ 0:
The general solution to the ODE is
/ðZÞ ¼ C1Zn1 þ C2Zn2  1þ kUK1c
  c
c 1 Z
c1
c
1
bþ kU þ
I  k
r þ kU Z;
where
n1;2 ¼
1 2 dr
h2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 2 dr
h2
 2
þ 8 dþkU
h2
r
2
:
Applying the standard methodology of smooth pasting i.e.
/ðZÞ ¼ c1cK
1
cZ
c1
c ;
/ZðZÞ ¼ K
1
cZ
1
c;
/ZðZÞ ¼ 0;
/ZZðZÞ ¼ 0:
to determine free boundaries Z and Z yields the following system
equations
C1Zn1 þ C2Zn2  1þ kUK1c
  c
c 1 Z
c1
c
1
bþ kU þ
I  k
r þ kU Z
¼ c
1 cK
1
cZ
c1
c ; ð13Þ
n1C1Zn11þn2C2Zn21 1þkUK
1
c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþkUþ
Ik
rþkU ¼K
1
cZ
1
c ; ð14Þ
n1C1Zn11 þ n2C2Zn21  1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþ kU þ
I  k
r þ kU ¼ 0; ð15Þ
n1ðn11ÞC1Zn12þn2ðn21ÞC2Zn22þ
1þkUK1c
 
c
Z
1
c1 1
bþkU ¼0: ð16Þ
With Eqs. (13) and (14), we obtain C1 and C2
C1¼
1þkUK1c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU n2
c
c11
 
ðn21Þ IkrþkUþK
1
cZ
1
c n2
c
1cþ1
 
ðn2n1ÞZn11 ;
C2¼
1þkUK
1
c
 
Z
1
c 1
bþkU n1
c
c11
 
ðn11Þ IkrþkUþK
1
cZ
1
c n1
c
1cþ1
 
ðn1n2ÞZn21 :
Also Eqs. (15) and (16) give C1 and C2
C1 ¼
1þkUK
1
c
 
Z
1c 1
bþkU
ðn21Þþ1cð Þðn21Þ IkrþkU
n1ðn2n1ÞZn11
;
C2 ¼
1þkUK
1
c
 
Z
1c 1
bþkU
ðn11Þþ1cð Þðn11Þ IkrþkU
n2ðn1n2ÞZn21
:
Assuming that Z ¼ CZ; C 2 ð0;1Þ and equating C1 and C2 yield
the following nonlinear equations of C
1þ kUK1c
 
C
1
c
1
bþ kU n2 n1
c
c 1 1
 
 n2ðn1  1Þ I  kr þ kU
þ K1cC1cZ1cn2 n1 c1 cþ 1
 
¼ Cn21 1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþ kU
 ðn1  1Þ þ 1c
 
 Cn21ðn1  1Þ I  kr þ kU ;
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 
C
1
c
1
bþ kU n1 n2
c
c 1 1
 
 n1ðn2  1Þ I  kr þ kU
þ K1cC1cZ1cn1 n2 c1 cþ 1
 
¼ Cn11 1þ kUK1c
 
Z
1
c
1
bþ kU
 ðn2  1Þ þ 1c
 
 Cn11ðn2  1Þ I  kr þ kU :
From previous equations we can determine Z by
Z
1
c¼ Ik
rþkU ðn1n2Þðn11ÞC
n21þðn21ÞCn11
n o
1þkUK1c
 h.
 1
bþkU ðn1n2ÞC
1c ðn11Þþ1c
 
Cn21

þ ðn21Þþ1c
 
Cn11

K1cC1cðn1n2Þ
Thus, eV ðkÞ is
eV ðkÞ ¼ C1kn1 þ C2kn2  1þ kUK1c  cc 1 1bþ kU kc1c þ I  kr þ kU k;
if Z 6 k 6 Z;
eV ðkÞ ¼ c
1 cK
1
ck
c1
c
 
; if k 6 Z;
eV ðkÞ ¼ C1Zn1 þ C2Zn2  1þ kUK1c  cc 1 1bþ kU Zc1c þ I  kr þ kU Z;
if k > Z: Proposition A.4. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) The optimal wealth process Wt is self-ﬁnanced by ct ¼
i1 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
for Yt described in Lemma A.2.
(b)
R t
0 HðtÞ ct  I  kU Wt Wt
 þ k  dt þ HðtÞWt is a martin-
gale under P-measure.Proof. (a)) (b) Suppose that Wt of (2) is self-ﬁnanced by
ct ¼ i1 kYt edtHðtÞ
 
. Assume F t-adapted portfolio pt together with
ct generates Wt. Thus, Wt has the dynamics
dWt ¼ rWt þ ptðl rÞ  ct þ I  kU Wt Wt
 þ k  	dt þ ptrdBt:
Then,
dðertWtÞ ¼ ert ct  I  kU Wt Wt
 þ k  	dt þ ertWtpt½ðl
 rÞdt þ rdBt 
¼ ert ct  I  kU Wt Wt
 þ k  	dt þ ertWtptrdeBt;
where eBt is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion under eP-
measure generated by the market price of risk h ¼ lrr . Thus, inte-
grating both sides over [0, t] givesZ t
0
ert ct  I  kU Wt Wt
 þ k  dt þ ertWt
¼W0 þ
Z t
0
ertWtptrdeBt :
Therefore,
R t
0 e
rtfct  I  ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞgdt þ ertWt is F t-mar-
tingale under eP-measure. Thus, by Bayes’ rule we haveR t
0 HðtÞfct  I  ðkUðWt WtÞ þ kÞgdt þ HðtÞWt is a martingale un-
der P-measure.
(b)) (a) This is a usual technique of the martingale method
using the martingale representation theorem. (See Theorems 4.4
and 4.6 of Karatzas and Shreve (1998).) hA.4. The proof of Theorem 3.3
Apply the Proposition A.4 and it remains to show thatR t
0 HðtÞ ct  I þ kþ kUfWt Wtg
 
dt þ HðtÞWt is a martingale under
P-measure. We will show the dt term of the differential form ofR t
0 HðtÞðct  I þ kþ kUfWt WtgÞdt þ HðtÞWt must be zero to in-
sure the martingale property.
HðtÞðct IþkþkUfWtWtgÞdtþdðHðtÞWtÞ
¼HðtÞðct IþkþkUfWtWtgÞdtþdHðtÞWtþHðtÞdWtþdHðtÞdWt
¼HðtÞ Zt
 1c IþkU K1c Zt 1cWtn oh idtþHðtÞðrdthdBtÞWt
þHðtÞ n1ðn11ÞC1 Zt
 n12n2ðn21ÞC2 Zt n221c 1þkUK1c  1bþkU Zt 1c1n oh
dZt
 þ12 n1ðn11Þðn12ÞC1 Zt n13n2ðn21Þðn22ÞC2 Zt n23þ1c 1cþ1 n
1þkUK
1
c
 
1
bþkU Z

t
 1c2o dZt 2iþHðtÞðrdthdBtÞ n1ðn11ÞC1 Zt n12nh
n2ðn21ÞC2 Zt
 n221c 1þkUK1c  1bþkU Zt 1c1o dZt þ12 n1ðn11Þðn12Þf
C1 Z

t
 n13n2ðn21Þðn22ÞC2 Zt n23þ1c 1cþ1  1þkUK1c  1bþkU Zt 1c2o dZt 2i
¼HðtÞ Zt
 1c IþkUfK1c Zt 1cWtgh idtþHðtÞðrdthdBtÞWt
þHðtÞ n1ðn11ÞC1 Zt
 n11n2ðn21ÞC2 Zt n211c 1þkUK1c  1bþkU Zt 1cn oh
ðdrÞdthdBtð Þþ12h2 n1ðn11Þðn12ÞC1 Zt
 n11n2ðn21Þðn22ÞC2 Zt n21n
þ1c 1cþ1
 
1þkUK
1
c
 
1
bþkU Z

t
 1codtiþHðtÞh2 n1ðn11ÞC1 Zt n11n2ðn21Þn
C2 Z

t
 n211c 1þkUK1c  1bþkU Zt 1codt:
Grouping dt term and Zt
 n11, Zt n21, Zt 1c yields
Zt
 n11 : ðrþkUÞn1C1ðd rÞn1ðn11ÞC112h2n1ðn11Þðn12Þ
C1h2n1ðn11ÞC1 ¼C1 12h
2n21þ d r
1
2
h2
 
n1ðdþkUÞ
 
¼0;
Zt
 n21 : ðr þ kUÞn2C1  ðd rÞn2ðn2  1ÞC1  12 h2n2ðn2  1Þðn2
 2ÞC1  h2n2ðn2  1ÞC1
¼ C1 12 h
2n22 þ d r 
1
2
h2
 
n2  ðdþ kUÞ
 
¼ 0;
Zt
 1c : 1þ kUK1c  1 r þ kUbþ kU  d rcðbþ kUÞ þ 12 h2 1c 1c þ 1
 
1
bþ kU

 h2 1
cðbþ kUÞ

¼ 1þ kUK1c
 
bþ kU  ðr þ kUÞ  d rc þ
1
2
h2
1
c
1
c
þ 1
 
 h2 1
c
 
 1
bþ kU ¼ 0:
Since dt term of the differential form of
R t
0 HðtÞ ct  Iþð
kþ kUfWt WtgÞdt þ HðtÞWt equals to 0,
R t
0 HðtÞðct  I þ kþ
kUfWt WtgÞdt þ HðtÞWt is a martingale under P-measure. Thus,
by Proposition 7.4 the optimal wealth process Wt of (6) is self-ﬁ-
nanced by ct ¼ i1ðkYt edtHðtÞÞ.
On the other hand, we can derive the optimal portfolio process
pt by comparing the dBt term of dWt of (6) and dBt term of dWt of
the given wealth dynamics.
n1ðn1  1ÞC1 Zt
 n11 þ n2ðn2  1ÞC2 Zt n21n
þ 1
c
1þ kUK1c
  1
bþ kU Z

t
 1ch ¼ ptr: 
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The homogeneous solution of second order linear ODE (10) is
TðZÞ ¼ C1Zm1 þ C2Zm2 ;
where
m1;2 ¼
ð1 2 dr
h2
Þ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 2 dr
h2
 2
þ 8 kU
h2
r
2
:
By utilizing the variation of parameters method, we can obtain
the nonhomogeneous solution of the ODE as
TðZÞ ¼ C1Zm1 þ C2Zm2 þ 1kU :
The boundary conditions T(Z) = 0, T 0ðZÞ ¼ 0 and the relation be-
tween Z and Z that Z ¼ CZ; C 2 ð0;1Þ give
C1 ¼ m2Z
m1
ðCm2m1  Cm1m2ÞkU
;C2 ¼ m1Z
m2
ðCm1m2  Cm2m1ÞkU
:
Thus we conclude that T(Z) is
TðZÞ ¼ m2Z
m1
ðCm2m1  Cm1m2ÞkU
Zm1 þ m1Z
m2
ðCm1m2  Cm2m1ÞkU
Zm2 þ 1
kU
:A.6. The proof of Theorem 4.2
We assume there is a ﬁltered probability space ðX; P;F ; fF tgÞ
and the ﬁltration fF tgtP0 satisfying the usual conditions. Also we
let Bt be a fF tg-adapted standard one-dimensional Brownian mo-
tion. Recall the process Zt with the following stochastic differential
equation
dZt ¼ ðd rÞZtdt  hZtdBt:
We can easily obtain the following density function of ﬁrst pas-
sage time for the process Zt
Pðs 2 dtÞ ¼
 1h ln Zk
 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pt3
p exp 
 1h ln Zk  d r  12 h2
 
1
h t
 2
2t
0B@
1CAdt:
Thus, P[s < sU] is given by the conditional probability of sU as
P½s < sU 
¼
Z 1
0
Z s
0
 1h ln Zk
 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pt3
p
 exp 
 1h ln Zk  d r  12 h2
 
1
h t
 2
2t
0B@
1CAdtkUekUs ds: References
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